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Summary 
In a country such as Zimbabwe where many are deprived of opportunities
and resources owing, in part, to injustices of the past, socio-economic
rights are of the outmost importance. As a result, the new Constitution of
Zimbabwe, adopted in 2013, expressly provides for socio-economic rights.
While these are yet to be extensively tested, two cases discussed in the
article illustrate the willingness of the courts to enforce these rights. In the
Mushoriwa case, it is shown that state as well as non-state actors have to
refrain from negatively interfering with constitutionally-protected and
enforceable socio-economic rights. The Hopcik case shows that there is a
positive obligation on the state, which may involve the allocation of
resources, to ensure that socio-economic rights are realised. These two
cases serve as a good platform from which the courts can continue to
develop the jurisprudence on socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe. It is
suggested that guidance in dealing with more complex socio-economic
rights cases can also be obtained from South African jurisprudence,
particularly from the Grootboom case. 
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1 Introduction 
In Zimbabwean history, the year 2008 is remembered for
unprecedented levels of socio-political upheaval. Politically, for the
first time since independence, motions were set into action for the
country to be governed under a Government of National Unity
(GNU).1 The need for the GNU came as a result of the 2008
parliamentary and presidential elections which were marred by
violence. As a result of the divisive political rift, mass killings occurred,
some unreported, creating social instability.2 Economically, the year
2008 marked Zimbabwe’s highest ever recorded inflation rate,
estimated at 231 million per cent per annum.3 Consequently,
shortages of food and currency, severe poverty and price increases,
amongst other challenges, became the Zimbabwean way of life.
These challenges left the standard and quality of life substantially
diminished. Also, as a result of the reduction in resources available to
the state, the capacity to deliver basic services was limited.
In this context, the year 2008 epitomised the worst form of socio-
economic challenges in the post-colonial era. From 2008 onwards,
Zimbabwe became a state in transition, awaiting the development of
a more comprehensive constitution, before further democratic
elections could be conducted.4 After the formation of the GNU,
efforts were made to ensure that the socio-economic rights5 of
1 The negotiations for the power-sharing deal were mediated by former South
African President Thabo Mbeki, from 31 July 2008, although, technically, the GNU
was formed on 13 February 2009. The GNU comprised of a coalition government
of the three major political parties in Zimbabwe. This union followed the signing
of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) by the parties concerned. 
2 See S Chan & R Primorac Zimbabwe since the unity government (2013) 8. In this
period, it is alleged that eight opposition supporters were killed, while at least
20 000 people were left displaced following the destruction of their homes. 
3 WJ Baumol & AS Blinder Economics: Principles and policy (2011) 506. Some
economists have argued that inflation rose higher that 231 million per cent.
However, their contestations have not been accepted widely. 
4 Art II of the GPA, which contained the declaration of commitment, noted: ‘The
parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, viable,
permanent, sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwean
situation and in particular to implement the following agreement with the aim of
resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and
charting a new political direction for the country.’ With regard to the transition, it
is important to read art II together with art VI which gave effect to an agreement
to draft constitutional measures. Art II acknowledged that the Lancaster House
Constitution (1979) was merely an apparatus to transfer power from the colonial
authority to the people of Zimbabwe and, as such, the constitution-making
process would be a people-driven process. Amongst other conditions, art VI
provided that a Select Committee of Parliament (with members of the
representative parties) be set up to draft the constitution-making process. The
draft Constitution as recommended by the Select Committee of Parliament would
be subjected to a referendum. 
5 Socio-economic rights are human rights related to the basic necessities of life,
such as the right to food; the right to shelter; the right to education; and the right
to work. See http://www.lrfzim.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Simplified-
Version-of-the-Declaration-of-Rights.pdf (accessed 13 March 2016). 
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citizens were given priority.6 Hence, there was a need for a new
constitution, including a seminal declaration of rights (bill of rights).
This was not a desire unique to Zimbabwe, but rather a need for any
society emerging from conflict or a period of struggle, such as the
period of election violence Zimbabwe had just emerged from.7 
In 2013, Zimbabwe finally adopted a new Constitution
(Constitution of Zimbabwe),8 providing for socio-economic rights.9
After the dawn of the new Constitution, it becomes important to take
stock of the state’s progress in protecting and promoting socio-
economic rights, to ensure that their effects filter down to the
ordinary man on the street.10 The article examines the preliminary
socio-economic rights debate, outlines the international socio-
economic rights framework, assesses the constitutional protection of
socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe, and evaluates the prospects and
challenges for the enforcement of socio-economic rights by the
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) and the courts. The
article then explores the empowering nature of socio-economic rights
in a transformative constitution and, lastly, a number of conclusions
are offered.
2 Preliminary socio-economic rights debate
As has been the case in many jurisdictions, in Zimbabwe there were
those vying for and against the inclusion of socio-economic rights in
the Zimbabwean Constitution.11 One of the arguments for the
protection of socio-economic rights in the Constitution was that
Zimbabwe was a state in transition after repression.12 As a result,
6 The GNU managed to finalise the constitution-making process in 2013, ushering
in a new constitutional era with a much broader protection of rights. In addition
to the efforts by the GNU to constitutionalise the protection of economic, social
and cultural rights, there were also efforts by civil society and the citizenry to
entrench these rights into the Constitution, as evidenced by the signing of the
Zimbabwe People’s Charter, in February 2008, by nationals representing various
cross-sections of various communities, across the length and breadth of the
country. The People’s Charter contained what was termed ‘a justiciable Bill of
Rights that recognises civil, political, social, economic, cultural and environmental
rights’. See the Zimbabwe People’s Charter, adopted at the People’s Convention,
Harare, Zimbabwe, 9 February 2008, available at http://www.kubatana.net/html/
archive/cact/080209pc.asp (accessed 13 March 2016).
7 C Heyns & D Brand ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African
Constitution’ (1998) 2 Law, Democracy and Development 153. 
8 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 20 of 2013. 
9 Constitution of Zimbabwe (n 8 above) Ch 4.
10 The socio-economic rights in the Declaration of Rights are modelled along socio-
economic rights in the South African Bill of Rights, which arguably contains the
most comprehensive constitutional protection of socio-economic rights, as well as
international human rights instruments.
11 See Heyns & Brand (n 7 above) 9. 
12 Zimbabwe, at the time, was under a GNU, which was as a result of political
violence during the 2008 elections.
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there were hazards in marginalising socio-economic imperatives.13
The argument espoused socio-economic rights as a moral prerogative
in the theory of justice.14 
Another argument in favour of socio-economic rights to be
included in the Constitution of Zimbabwe was that it would be an
important step towards the adoption of a rights-based approach to
social policy.15 Herein, the inclusion of socio-economic rights would
ensure that the underpinning rights in regional and international
human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Universal Declaration), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), were respected and
promoted.16 The inclusion of socio-economic rights in the
Constitution of Zimbabwe would merely ensure the domestic
accountability of Zimbabwe’s obligations to already-accepted and
ratified human rights treaties, rather than the extension of existing
commitments, in addition to those already in existence.17 In terms of
these human rights instruments, socio-economic rights are the
indispensable and inalienable rights of all human beings.18
Another related argument was that, in Zimbabwe, the protection of
socio-economic rights was a necessity because the nation was
recovering from an unpalatable period of hyper-inflation in which
many citizens were subjected to deplorable living conditions.19
Herein, at least half the population was dependant on food aid and
many were exposed to hunger and chronic malnutrition.20
Furthermore, almost three million people were affected annually by
malaria, and nearly 100 000 by cholera, with at least 4 000
fatalities.21 In a report providing for options for the constitutional
protection of socio-economic rights, the Zimbabwean Lawyers for
Human Rights and its partners noted:22
People around the world, including in Zimbabwe, face levels of deprivation
that undermine their ability to live with dignity. Hunger, homelessness, lack
of education and preventable disease are not simply social problems
13 I Muvingi ‘Sitting on powder kegs: Socio-economic rights in transitional societies’
(2009) 3 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 163. The argument,
therefore, was that the constitutional protection of socio-economic rights was a
transitional justice imperative. 
14 Muvingi (n 13 above) 3. 
15 T Masuka ‘The new Constitution of Zimbabwe and its implications for social
workers’ (2014) 2 Journal of Social Welfare and Human Rights 29.
16 For a detailed discussion, see Masuka (n 15 above) 29. 
17 http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Zimbabwe_6.23.09.pdf
(accessed 13 March 2016). 
18 See, eg, the Universal Declaration, Preamble; arts 1, 2, 17, 22, 25 & 27. 
19 http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/Zimbabwe_6.23.09.pdf
(accessed 13 March 2016). 
20 As above.
21 As above.
22 As above. 
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caused by inadequate resources but can also be violations of international
legal obligations to respect, protect and fulfil fundamental human rights.
Governments have a responsibility to respond and ameliorate these
violations, which threaten principles of human dignity.
One of the most significant arguments in favour of constitutional
socio-economic rights was that they were indivisible, interdependent
and interrelated to civil and political rights. Those in favour of this
argument were of the view that socio-economic rights formed part of
a larger network of rights which were symbiotic and mutually
reinforcing.23 The substance of their argument was based on the fact
that, without socio-economic rights, civil and political rights would
have been of a purely nominal character.24 Conversely, without civil
and political rights, socio-economic rights would not be sustainable.25
Therefore, the standalone civil and political rights in the Lancaster
House Constitution were purely nominal, and had to be pursued in
synergy with socio-economic rights. 
Apart from the arguments in favour of the constitutional protection
of socio-economic rights, there were also arguments against the
constitutional protection of socio-economic rights as justiciable
fundamental rights. These arguments are couched within the liberal
consensus on universal human rights, namely, that there is a hierarchy
of rights, with civil and political rights at the top of this hierarchy.26
According to Evans, this argument stems from the fact that civil and
political rights impose a ‘negative obligation’ (demanding
forbearance), while socio-economic rights impose a ‘positive
obligation’ (demanding a redistribution of resources).27 Therefore, it
would seem that civil and political rights would take the apex position
in the hierarchy as they are ‘an easy way out’, because they are easier
to guarantee. This is unlike socio-economic rights that demand the
mobilisation and rearrangement of national resources to assist those
who cannot provide the material means for a decent life for
themselves.28 In this case, socio-economic rights remain aspirational
rather than judicially-enforceable rights.29
For example, the initial drafters of the draft Zimbabwean
Constitution (Kariba Draft Constitution) were of the view that socio-
economic rights were not fundamental rights. They felt that socio-
economic rights rather were national objectives.30 Hence, in the
Kariba Draft Constitution, socio-economic rights appeared as national
23 As above.
24 Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenant on Human Rights,
prepared by the UN Secretary-General, UN Doc A/2929, 1955 7. 
25 As above.
26 T Evans ‘A human right to health’ (2003) 23 Third World Quarterly 200.
27 As above.
28 S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative constitution
(2010) 191.
29 I Trispiotis ‘Socio-economic rights: Legally enforceable or just aspirational’ (2010)
8 Opticon 1826 1.
30 Annexure B to the Kariba Draft Constitution, Chapter II, Part 2. 
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objectives that would guide all organs of state and government,
including local government.31 Consequently, in creating and
executing their policy towards the creation of a just, free and
democratic society, all arms of government had to take into account
the socio-economic objectives. The questionable challenge, however,
to socio-economic objectives was that they were directory in nature.32
This meant that socio-economic objectives were desirable but still
optional.33 The failure by an arm of government to comply with the
socio-economic objectives would, therefore, at most result in a
penalty, fine, review, revision or further compliance.34 Thus, the main
problem with the placement of socio-economic rights as socio-
economic national objectives in the Constitution of Zimbabwe was
that they would not be mandatory.35 
3 International human rights instruments
The Universal Declaration contains both socio-economic rights and
civil and political rights.36 Socio-economic rights are encompassed in
articles 16 and 22 to 27 of the Universal Declaration.37 These
provisions entitle the right to marry, to have a free choice in marriage
and to found a family;38 the right to choose employment, and to
form labour unions;39 the right to rest and leisure, including
reasonable limitation to working hours;40 the right to a standard of
living adequate for health and well-being;41 the right to education;42
and the right to participate freely in the cultural life of the community,
31 Kariba Draft Constitution, Chapter II, Part 2. Secs 25, 28, 29, 30 & 31 of the
Kariba Draft Constitution dealt with work and labour relations, education, shelter,
health services and social welfare, respectively. Sec 22(1)(c) of the Kariba Draft
Constitution, the national objective on children, also contained socio-economic
provisions, specifically for children. 
32 Kariba Draft Constitution, sec 14 (nature of objectives). 
33 AB Kafaltiya Interpretation of statutes (2008) 105. 
34 As above.
35 The Kariba Draft, thus, offered weak constitutional protection of socio-economic
rights as national objectives. Interestingly, however, despite the fact that the most
socio-economic rights contained in the Constitution as socio-economic objectives,
the right to agricultural land acquired for resettlement and other persons was
contained in the Kariba Draft Constitution as a fundamental right together with
the right to property. There have been arguments that these rights could be
excluded from socio-economic rights, if the guiding principle is to look at socio-
economic rights as contained in the ICESCR. This is despite the fact that, eg, the
right to property is a traditional economic right. See JA Mavedzenge & DJ Coltart
A constitutional guide towards understanding Zimbabwe’s fundamental socio-
economic and cultural human rights (2014) 12, for a deeper discussion. 
36 See I Merali & V Oosterveld Giving meaning to economic, social and cultural rights
(2011) 1.
37 Arts 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 & 27 Universal Declaration. 
38 Art 16 Universal Declaration.
39 Art 23 Universal Declaration. 
40 Art 24 Universal Declaration. 
41 Art 25 Universal Declaration. 
42 Art 26 Universal Declaration.
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to enjoy arts and to share in scientific development.43 Article 22
denotes that the realisation of these socio-economic rights is
indispensable to the dignity of a person.44 Accordingly, socio-
economic rights must be realised through national effort and
international co-operation dependant, however, on the organisation
and resources of each state.45
Over the years, the Universal Declaration has evolved to become
the cornerstone of international human rights law,46 despite its non-
binding nature.47 The norms crystallised in the Universal Declaration
were articulated in subsequent legally-binding treaties, such as the
ICESCR; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC); and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).
With regard to socio-economic rights, the ICESCR is the most
relevant treaty in protecting these rights. In general, the Preamble to
the ICESCR states: 
[I]n accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal
of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and what can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his
economic, social and cultural rights, as well as well as his civil and political
rights …
The Preamble of the ICESCR captures the idea that, ultimately, the
enjoyment of socio-economic rights is intricately connected to
freedom. Without freedom, there is no chance that an individual may
enjoy her socio-economic rights, let alone her civil and political rights.
Hence, fundamental rights and freedoms are interdependent and
interconnected. Although the Preamble is not binding, it encapsulates
the spirit of the ICESCR.48
More specifically, the ICESCR contains provisions that bestow socio-
economic rights. It notes that` everyone has the right to work in just
43 Art 27 Universal Declaration. 
44 Art 22 Universal Declaration.
45 As above.
46 See eg S Joseph & A McBeth (eds) Research handbook on international human
rights law (2010) 2; M Karavias Corporate obligations under international law (2013)
75; L Cotula Human rights, natural resources and investment law in a globalised law:
Shades of grey in the shadow of the law (2012) ch 2. 
47 The Universal Declaration was not adopted by the General Assembly as a legally-
binding instrument. Arguably, its contents have, however, been accepted as
norms of customary international law and are viewed by some as evolving
customary law. There have been arguments that the contents of the Universal
Declaration have now been accepted as fundamental principles of international
law and, as such, no deviation from these principles would be permissible. This is,
however, a debate that falls outside the scope of this article. See Joseph & McBeth
(n 46 above) 2 and Karavias (n 46 above) 2. 
48 See, generally, R O’Keefe & CJ Trans The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property: A commentary (2013) 30. 
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and favourable conditions;49 the right to form or join a trade union of
his or her choice;50 the right to social security (including social
insurance);51 the right to protection of the family;52 the right to an
adequate standard of living (inclusive of adequate food, clothing,
housing and incessant enhancements of living conditions);53 the right
to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health;54
and the right to education (free primary education, the progressive
introduction of free secondary education, and accessible higher
education, progressively made free).55
Moreover, each member state to the ICESCR should to the highest
possible extent of its available resources, individually or through
international co-operation, seek to progressively achieve the full
realisation of socio-economic rights.56 This entails that a member
state can use all appropriate means, including the promulgation of
new legislation, to fulfil socio-economic rights.57 Importantly,
however, socio-economic rights may be subject to limitations, only to
the extent necessary, in order to ensure the proper functioning of a
democracy.58
Apart from the ICESCR, the African Charter also is useful as it is the
African vanguard for the promotion of fundamental rights and
freedoms. The African Charter draws inspiration from other
international human rights instruments protecting socio-economic
rights, such as the ICESCR.59 The Charter recognises that without
49 Art 7 ICESCR. 
50 Art 8 ICESCR. 
51 Art 9 ICESCR. 
52 Art 10 ICESCR.
53 Art 11 ICESCR. 
54 Art 12 ICESCR. 
55 Art 13 ICESCR.
56 Art 2 ICESCR. 
57 As above. 
58 Art 4 ICESCR. Eg, sec 86 of the Constitution states that fundamental rights and
freedoms guaranteed in the Declaration of Rights must be exercised reasonably.
The section notes that these rights may be limited only in terms of the law of
general application to the extent that such a limitation is reasonable, necessary
and justiciable in an open and democratic society. This limitation can occur in the
interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health,
regional or town planning or the general public interest. Sec 86(3) lists rights
which can never be limited. However, this list only consists of civil and political
rights. Before any right is limited, it must be examined whether there are not any
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. In addition, the relationship
between the limitation and its purpose must be reviewed. 
59 Other instruments from which the African Charter draws inspiration include the
Universal Declaration; the ICCPR; the ICERD; the CEDAW; the CRC; the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities; the European Social Charter; the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and the American Convention on
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socio-economic rights, a person’s dignity is endangered.60 Individuals
are then exposed to numerous threats to their survival and well-being,
including marginalisation and economic impoverishment.61
Therefore, in providing for socio-economic rights, member states
must take into account the entire way of life of their people.62
In addition, the African Charter entrenches the freedom of
profession;63 the right to property;64 the right to work;65 the right to
health;66 the right to education;67 the right to housing;68 the right to
social security;69 the right to food;70 the right to water and
sanitation;71 and the right to protection of the family.72 The rights
guaranteed in the African Charter, however, are not all the rights
guaranteed in the ICESCR. Some of the rights in the ICESCR are
implied in the African Charter. For example, in Social and Economic
Action Centre (SERAC) & Another v Nigeria,73 the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) held that the
rights to food and shelter were implicit in the African Charter.74 This
was reiterated in the Tunis Reporting Guidelines.75
Member states must ensure that socio-economic rights are
available, adequate, accessible (physically and economically) and
acceptable.76 The African Charter imposes obligations on member
states to respect, protect, promote and fulfil socio-economic rights.77
The fulfilment of socio-economic rights nevertheless is subject to
available resources and progressive realisation.78 There are, however,
minimum core obligations with which the state must comply.79 As far
as possible, each member state must maintain the minimum level of
59 Human Rights and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. See State Party
Reporting Guideline for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Tunis Reporting Guidelines), adopted
24 November 2011. See also http://www.achpr.org/sessions/51st/resolutions/
223/ (accessed 13 March 2016).
60 Tunis Reporting Guidelines (n 59 above) 6.
61 As above.
62 As above.
63 Art 8 African Charter.
64 Art 14 African Charter.
65 Art 15 African Charter. 
66 Art 16 African Charter. 
67 Art 17 African Charter.
68 Arts 14, 16 & 18(1) African Charter.
69 Arts 4, 5, 6, 15, 16, 18(1), (2) & (4) African Charter.
70 Arts 4, 16 & 22 African Charter.
71 Arts 4, 5, 15, 16, 22 & 24 African Charter.
72 Art 18(1) African Charter.
73 (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001).
74 Judgment paras 64-66 & 59-63.
75 Tunis Reporting Guidelines (n 59 above) 48-53. 
76 Tunis Reporting Guidelines 10-11. 
77 Tunis Reporting Guidelines 11.
78 Tunis Reporting Guidelines 12.
79 Tunis Reporting Guidelines 3.
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socio-economic rights in the African Charter.80 Whether or not the
state has resources, the minimum core obligations cannot be
dispensed with.81 In addition, there also is an immediate obligation
on states to take steps towards the realisation of socio-economic
rights, through the implementation of a quantifiable national plan of
action. States should also guard against any measure(s) that may
affect the enjoyment of socio-economic rights.82
Notwithstanding the above, states should ensure that individuals
have ready access under domestic law to effective remedies and
redress.83 The Tunis Reporting Guidelines detail how these rights
should be interpreted and applied, making the African Charter a
practical document for the protection of socio-economic rights in
Africa.84
From the above discussion, it may be noted that international
human rights instruments are paramount to the protection of socio-
economic rights. Equally important, however, is the status of these
instruments in the domestic legal system. The 2013 Constitution, in
contradistinction to the Lancaster House Constitution, provides clarity
on the status of international documents. Section 327 of the
Constitution states that85 
[a]n international treaty which has been concluded or executed by the
President or under the President’s authority (a) does not bind Zimbabwe
until it has been approved by Parliament; and (b) does not form part of the
law of Zimbabwe until it has been approved by an Act of Parliament. 
Put more simply, international treaties in Zimbabwe are binding only
once they have been enacted into law by parliament, with the
President’s authority.86 Important also is the fact that the state is
enjoined in section 34 of the Constitution to ensure that all
international agreements to which Zimbabwe is a party are
incorporated into domestic law.87
To date, Zimbabwe has signed and ratified most of the key human
rights instruments,88 but is yet to domesticate these through national
80 Tunis Reporting Guidelines 13. 
81 Should a state fail to comply with the minimum core obligations, it must be able
to prove that it has allocated all available resources towards meeting the minimum
core obligations. 
82 Tunis Reporting Guidelines (n 59 above) 14. 
83 Tunis Reporting Guidelines 14.
84 There are, however, other instruments, but for the purpose of this article, the
discussion has been focused on the Universal Declaration, the ICESCR and the
African Charter, as the most robust documents dealing with socio-economic
rights. 
85 Sec 237 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
86 http://www.academia.edu/4690926/The_Application_of_International_Law_in_Zi
mbabwe_in_light_of_the_New_Constitution_and_the_Doctrine_of_National_Sove
reignity (accessed 29 March 2017). 
87 Sec 34 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
88 Eg, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the ICCPR, the
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of
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law to ensure their full implementation.89 Most notably, and in
connection with socio-economic rights, Zimbabwe has not
domesticated the African Charter and the ICESCR.90 The implication
of this in a dualist state,91 such as Zimbabwe, is that citizens cannot
claim rights or protections which are provided for by these treaties as
they have not been made part of national law through an Act of
Parliament (as required by section 327 of the Constitution). There is,
therefore, an urgent need to add these instruments to the
government's 'list of international instruments for which
domesticating Bills are required'.92 The ongoing process of aligning
old laws with the new Constitution could also be used as a platform to
kick-start this process.93 
In addition, Zimbabwe has not accepted the jurisdiction of the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) or made
a declaration under article 34(6) to the Court Protocol.94 In addition
to this, Zimbabwe has not become a state party to the Optional
Protocol to the ICESCR. This creates numerous challenges in terms of
protecting socio-economic rights. Most importantly, this limits the
avenues for claimants of rights to have forums where they can seek
recourse in the case of a violation of their rights. 
An interesting juxtaposition can be found in the way in which
customary international law and international treaties are dealt with in
terms of the Constitution. In terms of section 326 of the Constitution,
customary international law is deemed to be a part of Zimbabwean
law unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of
Parliament.95 This is unlike international treaties which need to be
incorporated by an Act of Parliament. The implication of this is that if
a case is brought on the basis of a violation of a principle of customary
international law, the courts can rely on customary international law
as it is deemed part of the law. Customary international law in
Zimbabwe, therefore, is more than merely a source of interpretation.
88 Women in Africa; the ICERD; and CEDAW.
89 A Hellum & HS Aasen (eds) Women's human rights: CEDAW in international, regional
and national law (2013) 474.
90 https://www.newsday.co.zw/2015/12/12/zim-urged-to-domesticate-human-
rights-treaties/ (accessed 4 April 2017). In 2013, the former Minister of Justice,
Patrick Chinamasa, disturbingly noted that there were no proper records of the
treaties the country had signed and ratified to facilitate domestication. 
91 A dualist state is one which views international law and domestic law as two
separate orders. For international law to be binding in such a system, it must,
therefore, be domesticated via legislative measures. Sec 327 of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe concretises Zimbabwe's position as a dualist state. See http://
www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/HumanRights/
bangamwabo.pdf (accessed 5 April 2016). 
92 http://thezimbabwean.co/2017/03/zimbabwe-human-rights-commission-report/
(accessed 5 April 2017).
93 http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/ciz_crisis_report_issue_243_131203.pdf
(accessed 5 April 2017). 
94 As above. 
95 Sec 326 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
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As regards international treaties, agreements and conventions, a case
for the violation of these would only be successful if such treaty,
convention or agreement has been incorporated into domestic law by
an Act of Parliament. 
4 Constitutional protection of socio-economic rights
The Constitution of Zimbabwe is the supreme law of the land.96 It
provides a ‘yardstick for determining lawful government action and
protecting individual rights'.97 It also embodies the need to entrench
democracy, good, transparent and accountable government as well as
the rule of law.98 Furthermore, the Constitution embeds the
commitment to uphold and defend fundamental human rights and
freedoms.99 
Chapter 4 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Declaration of
Rights, expressly provides for socio-economic rights.100 These include
the freedom of profession, trade or occupation;101 labour rights;102
property rights;103 the rights to agricultural land;104 the right to
education;105 the right to healthcare; and the right to food.106 As a
result, considerable constitutional protection of socio-economic rights
is attained.107 
These rights impose upon the state an obligation to respect,
promote and fulfil them.108 A similar obligation also is imposed on
non-state actors through the horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights.109 This is so because many of the provisions in the
Constitution would be superfluous if non-state actors could not be
held accountable to constitutional mandates.110 For instance, the
right to safe, clean and potable water in section 77(a) of the
96 Sec 2(1) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
97 http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/history/LEGAL/CP108055.PDF
(accessed 5 March 2017). 
98 Preamble Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
99 As above. Fundamental rights and freedoms are founding values and principles to
which the Constitution aspires. 
100 Annex C to the Lancaster House Agreement, 21 December 1979, Southern
Rhodesia Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House, London. 
101 Sec 64 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
102 Sec 65 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
103 Sec 71 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
104 Sec 72 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
105 Sec 75 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
106 Sec 77 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
107 T Chivuru ‘Socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe’s new Constitution’ (2014) 36
Strategic Review for Southern Africa 118.
108 Sec 44 Constitution of Zimbabwe.
109 As above.
110 AR Welch ‘Obligations of state and non-state actors regarding the right to water
under the South African Constitution’ (2005) 1 Sustainable Development Law and
Policy 63. 
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Constitution cannot be realised if private actors such as construction
companies are putting potable water to waste.111 Questions,
however, remain as to whether positive obligations may also be
placed upon non-state actors. 
Interestingly, some socio-economic rights also are contained in
Chapter 2 of the Constitution as national objectives.112 For example,
section 13(3) of the Constitution provides that the state and all
institutions and agencies of government must protect and enhance
the right of the people, particularly women, to equal opportunities in
development. This approach is different to that in the South African
Constitution, which makes reference only to rights in the Bill of
Rights.113 
The socio-economic rights contained in Chapter 2 of the
Constitution are merely non-justiciable national objectives, which
should not be conflated with justiciable Chapter 4 rights. It is also
worth noting that the non-justiciable rights in Chapter 2 should, in
theory, be protected by interpreting the wide justiciable rights in
Chapter 4.
Commenting upon the socio-economic rights in Chapter 2,
Chivuru notes that these rights place a minimum burden on the
state.114 In his view, the state is not obliged to respect and promote
these rights.115 He reasons that as Chapter 2 contains national
objectives, ‘it would create a political and societal space for a just and
democratic society’.116 
The Constitution, 'in describing the rights it enshrines', in part
mirrors the language used by the drafters of the South African
Constitution, in an act of 'constitutional borrowing'. It uses inclusive
language such as ‘everyone has the right to’ or ‘the Bill of Rights
applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive the judiciary
and all organs of state’.117 
The language and contents of the Zimbabwean Constitution also
depict the influence of international law instruments such as the
ICESCR and the African Charter, which similarly give prominence to
fundamental human rights and freedoms. For instance, all the socio-
economic rights contained in the ICESCR are reflected in the
Zimbabwean Constitution. These include the freedom of profession,
111 Sec 77(a) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
112 Chapter 2 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
113 Chapter 2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It has been argued
that the South African Constitution has the most comprehensive constitutional
protection of socio-economic rights. 
114 Chivuru (n 107 above) 118.
115 This is a similar argument to the one contained in the draft Constitution that
provided for socio-economic objectives, a provision which was discarded in the
final Constitution. See sec 2 for the implication of socio-economic objectives. 
116 Chivuru (n 107 above) 118.
117 See Ch 2 of the South African Constitution. 
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trade or occupation; labour rights; the right to education; the right to
health care; and the right to food and water.118 
However, the Constitution does not borrow from the Directive
Principles of State Policy.119 The phraseology used in these two
instruments is significantly different. For example, the Directive
Principles speak to the provision of free and compulsory education for
children while, on the other hand, the Zimbabwean Constitution
alludes to free and compulsory basic education for children and
higher and tertiary education.120 The language used in the
Zimbabwean Constitution, therefore, is much broader than that in the
Directive Principles. 
While the Zimbabwean Constitution provides for the constitutional
protection of socio-economic rights, this is not enough to ensure the
realisation of these rights. Their enforcement needs a sound
institutional framework. At the international level, most human rights
instruments prescribe that states must institute domestic mechanisms
or measures to protect and promote human rights.121
In Zimbabwe, there are two main institutions enforcing human
rights – the ZHRC and the courts. While both institutions are
important in the enforcement of human rights, it is perhaps arguable
that courts have a more prominent role to play. Nonetheless, the role
of the ZHRC in enforcing socio-economic rights will first be dealt with,
whereafter the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is
considered.
5 Enforcement of socio-economic rights by the 
national human rights commission
Chapter 12 of the Constitution establishes independent institutions
supporting democracy, which will be referred to as ‘Chapter 12
institutions’. These autonomous institutions are charged with the task
of strengthening democracy in Zimbabwe through (i) support for the
entrenchment of human rights; (ii) the elevation of sovereignty and
the interests of the people; (iii) the advancement of constitutionalism;
(iv) the elevation of accountability and transparency in public
institutions; (v) the facilitation of the adherence to democratic values
and principles by all state-related actors; and (vi) the promotion of
remedies for injustices.122 Notwithstanding the fact that Chapter 12
institutions must discharge their duties without fear, favour or
118 The Constitution further introduces other rights not contained in these
instruments, such as the right to agricultural land.
119 http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/p04.html (accessed 27 February 2017).
120 Sec 27 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
121 L Chiduza ‘The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission: Prospects and challenges
for the protection of human rights’ (2015) 19 Law, Democracy and Development
148. 
122 Sec 233 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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prejudice123 and without being subject to the direction or control of
anyone,124 their conduct must, however, be consistent with the
Constitution.125 Nonetheless, in the execution of their duties, Chapter
12 institutions must be accountable to parliament to ensure the
efficient performance of their functions.126
One of the institutions established in terms of Chapter 12 is the
ZHRC.127 The ZHRC is a national human rights institution (NHRI)
entrusted with the responsibility of, amongst other things, the
protection, promotion, development and attainment of fundamental
rights and freedoms at all levels of society.128 Its focus is particularly
geared at the broader human rights issues related to fundamental
rights and freedoms.129
The ZHRC wields the power to at any time require any person,
institution or agency, state or otherwise, to report to the Commission
on what measures they have taken to protect and fulfil the rights in
the Declaration of Rights.130 It may also require from any of these
actors information necessary to compile a report relating to human
rights to be submitted to any regional or international body, treaty or
agreement to which Zimbabwe is a state party.131 
In terms of section 323 of the Constitution, the ZHRC, as an
independent commission, must annually submit a report to
parliament via the responsible Minister.132 However, in certain
instances, when the Commission believes that a particular matter
should be given attention by parliament, the matter of which relates
to fundamental rights and freedoms, it may through the appropriate
Minister submit a report to parliament pertaining to such matter.133
The mandate of the ZHRC differs from that of its South African
counterpart, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC),
which has a twofold mandate.134 First, its general mandate is to
monitor and assess the protection and promotion of all human rights.
Second, the special mandate is with respect to socio-economic rights.
This mandate arose as a result of South Africa’s turbulent history,
which led to the disenfranchisement of the majority. In terms of this
123 Sec 235(1)(c) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
124 Sec 235(1)(a) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
125 Sec 235(1)(b) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
126 Sec 235(1)(c) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
127 Sec 242 Constitution of Zimbabwe. The ZHRC was established in 2009 under the
auspices of the GNU, after the disputed 2008 elections.
128 Sec 243(1)(b) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
129 Sec 243 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
130 Sec 244(1)(a) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
131 Sec 244(1)(b) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
132 Such a report must be filed before the end of March of the year following that to
which the report relates. 
133 Sec 244(2) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
134 D Horsten ‘The role played by the South African Human Rights Commission’s
economic and social reports in good governance in South Africa’ (2006) 9
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 179.
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mandate, the SAHRC requests from organs of state information
pertaining to socio-economic rights. The lack of a secondary mandate
of the ZHRC, as the one entrusted to the SAHRC, does not diminish
the pedestal role required of the ZHRC. 
According to the African Commission, NHRIs play a central role in
ensuring the protection of socio-economic rights.135 The United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR
Committee) notes:136
[N]ational institutions have a potentially crucial role to play in promoting
and ensuring the indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights.
Unfortunately, this role has too often either not been accorded to the
institution or has been neglected or given a low priority by it. It is therefore
essential that full attention be given to economic, social and cultural rights
in all of the relevant activities of these institutions.
As a result, it is paramount that, within the functioning of NHRIs
adequate regard be given to socio-economic rights in the all the
undertakings of such institutions.137 
The challenge that continues to hamper the proper functioning of
the ZHRC is that of funding. Operations of the Commission have been
hamstrung by this financial crisis, which led to the resignation of the
first Chairperson of the Commission, Reg Austin.138 In the first four
years of operation, the Commission had virtually no budget.139 By
2013, the government had steadily increased funding, but it still
stood at a measly US $2 million. This eased the challenges of the
ZHRC, leading to increased capacity utilisation, with 62 per cent of
staff posts being filled by 2014.140 In a paper examining the prospects
and challenges of the ZHRC, Chiduza concluded that for the ZHRC to
effectively discharge its duties, it must be adequately funded.141 
These financial challenges of the ZHRC continue despite the fact
that section 322 of the Constitution specifically states that parliament,
as the custodian of the legislative processes, must ensure that
adequate funds are available for use by commissions, to enable them
to successfully discharge their duties. This is further reinforced in
section 325 of the Constitution, which resoundingly states that the
state must provide sufficient funds to commissions and other
institutions established in terms of the Constitution to guarantee their
proper functioning. The state has to begin prioritising the
appropriation of funds for the ZHRC (and other commissions and
135 Tunis Reporting Guidelines (note 59 above) 18.
136 ESCR Committee General Comment 10.
137 Horsten (n 134 above) 178-179. 
138 ‘ZHRC hamstrung by funding: Mugwadi’ The Independent 29 August 2014. 
139 As above.
140 As above. 
141 Chiduza (n 121 above) 174. 
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constitutionally-established institutions) so that it does not have to
rely on donors to cover parts of its shortfalls.142
6 Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights
The courts are vested with judicial authority which is derived from the
people of Zimbabwe.143 According to section 164 of the Constitution,
‘[t]he courts are independent and are subject only to [the]
Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially,
expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice’.144 It is important
to note some of the principles guiding the judiciary including, but not
limited to, the following, that (a) justice must be done to all,
irrespective of status;145 (b) justice must not be delayed and, to that
end, members of the judiciary must perform their duties efficiently
and with reasonable promptness;146 (c) the role of the courts is
paramount in safeguarding human rights and freedoms and the rule
of law.147
The last principle above, espoused in section 165(1)(c) of the
Constitution, is of particular interest to this article. Section 165(1)(c) is
instructive in respect of the role of the courts in safeguarding human
rights and freedoms and the rule of law. The question, therefore, that
arises is what the role of the courts is in safeguarding and promoting
socio-economic rights. I am of the view that the point of departure to
answer this question is to first examine the meaning of judicial
enforcement.
Mbazira expresses the view that judicial enforcement refers to the
role of court in satisfying the transformative vision of the Constitution
in moving from the socio-economic deprivation of the majority to the
equitable distribution of resources.148 Another view is to look at
judicial enforcement, as not only recognising the need for
government to account to democratic processes, but also ensuring
that accountability is possible through litigation.149 Judicial
enforcement, therefore, ensures that the rights, freedoms and
guarantees in the Constitution can be litigated should they be
violated. 
142 Currently, 30% of the income of the ZHRC comes from the donors while the
remaining 70% comes from the government. 
143 Sec 162 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
144 Sec 164 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
145 Sec 165(1)(a) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
146 Sec 165(1)(b) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
147 Sec 165(1)(c) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
148 CC Ngang ‘Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights in South Africa and the
separation of powers objection: The obligation to take other measures’ (2014) 14
African Human Rights Law Journal 661.
149 Ngang (n 148 above) 661.
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The Constitution150 and Zimbabwe’s commitment to international
human rights instruments impose an obligation on the courts to
enforce socio-economic rights.151 Therefore, when the state fails to
honour its obligation to protect, promote and fulfil socio-economic
rights, the court should question this failure and take measures to
ensure that the state fulfils its obligations.152 According to the
International Forum for Jurists:153
Courts and quasi-judicial bodies have an important role to play in the legal
enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights. Judicial remedies can
provide remedies in individual cases, and can directly or indirectly result in
substantial changes in domestic law and policy.
According to section 85(1) of the Constitution, an aggrieved member
of society can approach the court to contend an alleged or potential
violation of fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in the
Declaration of Rights (for example, a violation of socio-economic
rights). In response to the contention, the court may grant
appropriate relief, which may include a declaration of rights or an
award of compensation.154 Mavedzenge and Coltart aver that the
court may also award a prohibitive interdict,155 a mandamus,156 or a
structured interdict in the case of a violation of socio-economic
rights.157 In the case of legislation prohibiting the full enjoyment of
socio-economic rights, the court can also order a declaration of
invalidity in terms of section 175(6)(b) of the Constitution, which
grants the court the discretion to make an order that is just and
equitable.
Section 85(1) of the Constitution was invoked in the 2016 case of
Mudzuru.158 Here, the applicants applied to the Constitutional Court
in terms of section 85(1) of the Constitution asking the Court to
interpret and apply constitutional provisions as they related to early
150 Sec 165(1)(c) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
151 See sec 3. 
152 Ngang (n 148 above) 662.
153 http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Universal-Judicial-Enforcement-
ESCR-Geneva-Forum-Series-2-Publications-Conference-Report-2015-ENG.pdf
(accessed 13 March 2016).
154 Sec 85(1)(e) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
155 A prohibitive interdict will stop or deter the ongoing violation of a right. See
Mavedzenge & Coltart (n 35 above) 17-18 for a discussion on the various
remedies available. 
156 As above. In this context, a mandamus could be applied to force a respondent to
perform a certain action or fulfil the disputed right. 
157 As above. Under a structured interdict, a perpetrator is compelled to take
measures to cure the violation of a right under the direction and supervision of
the court. 
158 Mudzuru & Another v Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs (NO) &
Others (Const Application 79/14) [2015] ZWCC. In this case, the Constitutional
Court found sec 22(1) of the Marriage Act and any law, custom and practice
which authorises child marriages unconstitutional (inclusive of the Customary
Marriages Act [Chapter 5: 07], to the extent that it permitted child marriages). 
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child marriages.159 The Court also dealt with the question of whether
the applicants had locus standi to engage in public interest ligation to
enforce the rights in the Bill of Rights.160 
In interpreting the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Court noted
that the courts had to develop ‘new clear and precise
jurisprudence’.161 The Court argued that the Constitution was a
transformative document that sought to create a break with the
past162 and, accordingly, had to be interpreted progressively,
generously and purposefully.163 Importantly, the Court also noted
that it was common cause, when interpreting the Bill of Rights, to
seek guidance from international jurisprudence and international
instruments, particularly those ratified by Zimbabwe.164
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court noted that, pursuant to
section 44 of the Constitution, there was an obligation to protect
every right in the Declaration of Rights, regardless of the socio-
economic standing of the rights bearer.165 The Court then used the
following imagery:166
Like a shepherd who cannot escape liability for a lost sheep by claiming
ignorance of what happened to it, the state is expected to know what is
happening to fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 4
[Declaration of Rights]. It is under an obligation to account, in the public
interest, for any infringement of a fundamental right even by a private
person.
The intention of the Court in the above imagery was to show that the
courts have a vested obligation to ensure that fundamental rights and
freedoms can be enjoyed in practice.167 The Court further argued that
section 85(1) provided an opportunity for multiple interests of
different sections of society to find redress from the Court.168 The
Court reasoned that the objective of such a wide representation was
159 In analysing this issue, the Court noted that, while there was no standing to bring
the matter under sec 85(1)(a) of the Constitution, there was, however, sufficient
interest under sec 85(1)(d), as children’s rights were of a public concern. The
Court, however, cautioned that, in future, the unlimited right of access offered by
sec 85 could be replaced with the ‘interest of justice’ rule. See judgment (n 158
above) 22.
160 The second issue was whether sec 78(1) of the Constitution set the minimum
marriageable age in Zimbabwe at 18. The third issue was whether sec 22(1) of the
Marriages Act was invalidated by secs 78(1) and 81(1). 
161 Mudzuru judgment (n 158 above) 8.
162 Mudzuru judgment 9. 
163 Mudzuru judgment 8-9.
164 Mudzuru judgment 42.
165 Mudzuru judgment 12. 
166 Mudzuru judgment 13.
167 Mudzuru judgment 14.
168 As above. Sec 85 of the Constitution provides that the enforcement of
fundamental rights and freedoms can be done by any of the following persons,
namely, (a) any person acting on their own interests; (b) any person acting on
behalf of another person who cannot act for themselves; (c) any person acting as
a member, or in the interests, of a group or class of persons; (d) any person acting
in the public interest; (e) any association acting in the interests of its members. 
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to dismantle the formal barriers in the legal system and, in so doing,
to provide tangible, significant, justice for the masses.169 The
Constitutional Court noted:170
The right to access justice, which itself a fundamental right, must be made
available to a person who is able to, under each of the rules of standing, to
vindicate the interest adversely affected by an infringement of a
fundamental right, at the same time enforcing the constitutional obligation
to protect and promote the right or freedom concerned.
Consistent with the judgment delivered by Chaskalson P in Ferrreira v
Levin NO & Others,171 the Constitutional Court argued for a broad
approach so that rights can enjoy full constitutional protection.172 In
this bid, the Court observed:
The liberation of the narrow traditional conception of standing and the
provision of the fundamental right of access to justice compel a court
exercising jurisdiction under [section] 85(1) of the Constitution to adopt a
broad and generous approach to standing. The approach must eschew
over reliance on procedural technicalities, to afford full protection to the
fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in Chapter 4.
The judgment by Malaba DCJ in the Mudzuru case is very informative
with regard to the interpretation and enforcement of fundamental
rights and freedoms. The judgment illustrates the need for a broad
approach to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms are
protected. As envisaged by sections 85(1)(a)-(e), anyone who feels
aggrieved that their socio-economic rights are being violated can
approach the courts. One could even go as far as litigating socio-
economic rights on the basis of public interest.173
The Mudzuru case underscored the resolve of the Constitutional
Court in upholding fundamental right and freedoms, more broadly.
However, socio-economic rights are yet to be extensively tested in
Zimbabwean courts. With regard to the negative interference in socio-
economic rights, the case of Farai Mushoriwa v City of Harare
(Mushoriwa case)174 is worth mentioning. 
The facts of the matter, which were not contested by the parties,
were that the applicant was a lawful tenant occupying flat 12 of the
Northcliff block of flats in the City of Harare,175 while the respondent
was the City of Harare, a duly-constituted urban municipal authority
in terms of the Urban Councils Act [29:15].176 The City of Harare was
the sole supplier of domestic water in the city, including to the block
of flats where the applicant resided. During May 2013, the applicant
169 Mudzuru judgment 14.
170 As above.
171 CT5/95 1996 ZACC 27.
172 Mudzuru judgment (n 158 above) 15.
173 Sec 85(1)(d) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
174 (HC 4266/13) [2014] ZWHHC 195. 
175 Moshoriwa judgment 1. 
176 As above.
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received a bill of US $1 700 for the purported rendering of water
services.177 The applicant disputed the amount in question, and that
he owed any amount to the respondent.178 On 31 May 2013, the
respondent then shut off the water supply of the applicant, leading to
the urgent application by the applicant to the High Court. 
The respondent argued that in terms of section 8 of the City of
Harare’s water by-law read together with ‘[section] 198(3) and
[section] 69 of the third schedule to the Urban Councils Act it is
clothed with unfettered discretion to disconnect water supplies to a
citizen at will without recourse to the courts of law’.179 The counter-
argument of the applicant was that ‘[t]he by-law relied upon by the
[r]espondent [w]as ultra vires section 198 as read with [section]
69(2)(e) of the third schedule to the parent Act and [section] 77 of
the Constitution’.180
The applicant sought a spoliation order and an interdict as an
interim measure.181 Herein, the applicant pursued the restoration of
his power supply. As a final order, the applicant sought an order
showing the following:
(a) the termination by the respondent of the applicant’s water supply on
the basis of a disputed water bill and in the absence of a court order
is unlawful self-help;
(b) that the respondent and all its employees be interdicted from
interfering in any way whatsoever with, disrupting or terminating the
applicant’s water supply without a court order; 
(c) that the respondents shall pay all of the cost of the suit on the higher
scale of legal practitioner and client scale only if it opposes the
application.
Section 77 of the Constitution provides for the right to food and
water. It states:
Every person has the right to – 
(a) safe, clean and potable water; and 
(b) sufficient food;
and the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within
the limits of resources available to it, to achieve the progressive realisation
of the rights set out in this section. 
The High Court in this matter first noted the obligation in section 44
of the Constitution to protect fundamental rights and freedoms
imposed on all persons, natural and juristic, including every institution
and agency of government at every level. It observed that in this
177 Moshoriwa judgment 2.
178 As above.
179 Moshoriwa judgment 3.
180 Moshoriwa judgment 4.
181 Moshoriwa judgment 1.
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particular case, the respondent was an institution of local governance
and was therefore obligated not to deny citizens water without just
cause.182 It noted that the role of the courts in promoting and
safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms, as guaranteed in
section 165(1)(c) of the Constitution, was essential to the functioning
of the rule of law. 
In attempting to interpret the role of the court in protecting and
promoting socio-economic rights, in particular the right to water and
food, the High Court quoted the words of Francis Bennion, in his
book Statutory interpretation (1984), where he stated:183
A court is an agency charged with the function of exercising the judicial
power of the state. Only a court as thus defined has the power
authoritatively to determine what the law is, and therefore what is the legal
meaning of a relevant enactment.
The High Court was of the view that Bennion’s statement accorded
with section 171 of the Constitution. Pursuant to section 171, the
High Court has jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters, with
unlimited jurisdiction throughout the country, except in cases where
the power of the Court has been expressly limited by parliament.184
The High Court noted that it had been conferred powers by the
Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, to rule over this matter
and subsequently to make a determination.185 Resultantly, the Court
took the view that it could, therefore, not abdicate its function
because of an errant and unlawful municipal by-law, which was
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution as well as the enabling
statute.186
More specially, the High Court noted that section 8 of by-law 164
of 1913 was inconsistent with the Constitution and the enabling
statute in more than one way.187 As a point of departure, section 8 of
by-law 164 enabled the respondent to ‘arbitrarily deprive citizens of
their fundamental right to water without compensation contrary to
[section] 85 of the Constitution which entitles an aggrieved person to
appropriate compensation whenever his fundamental right has been
violated’.188 To add to that,189
in the event of a disputed bill it unlawfully confer[red] the respondent with
the sole jurisdiction to arbitrarily determine the dispute without recourse to
the courts of law contrary to the provisions of [section] 69 of the third
schedule to the Act as read with [section] 165 (1)(c) of the Constitution. By
so doing the by-law allows the [r]espondent to be the sole arbiter in its
182 Moshoriwa judgment 5.
183 As above.
184 Moshoriwa judgment 6.
185 As above.
186 As above.
187 As above.
188 As above.
189 As above.
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own case contrary to the well-established common law maxim that no one
should be a judge in his own case.
Section 8 of the by-law did not serve a public function, and was rather
in violation of basic legal principles (such as that the Harare City
Council could be a judge in its own case).190 In the opinion of the
Court it was notorious that the City Council could exercise its right to
collect debts by willy-nilly barring citizens’ access to water, a
fundamental right, without affording them recourse to the law and
courts; in clear violation of public interest, the enabling statute and
the Constitution.191 The Court observed that in a similar case, City of
Cape Town v Strumpher (pre-2013 Constitution),192 the court had
come to the same conclusion.193 The High Court then granted the
interim relief, and ordered that the respondent, through his legal
counsel, show why the final relief should not be granted.194
The Mushoriwa case demonstrates that when faced with a challenge
to socio-economic rights, the court will not hesitate to grant
appropriate relief.195 The court, therefore, showed that it has the
power to adjudicate on matters concerning the infringement of socio-
economic rights without fear, favour or prejudice.196 Furthermore, the
courts are alert to usurpers of power who abuse their authority to
violate socio-economic rights, to the detriment of society.197 For these
reasons, the courts can then be said to be custodians of the
enforcement of socio-economic rights.
The Mushoriwa and Mudzuru cases both dealt with the ‘negative
interference of rights with enjoyment of existing rights’. However, in
most instances, the challenge with socio-economic rights claims ‘is
mostly with enforcing positive claims’, for instance, the duty of the
state to provide for the guaranteeing of socio-economic rights. A
good case in point is the recent case of Hopcik Investment (Pty Ltd) v
Minister of Environment Water and Climate and City of Harare (Hopcik
case).198
In this case, the applicant, Hopcik Investment (Pty Ltd), sought an
order compelling the respondents, the Minister of Environment,
Water and Climate and the City of Harare, to supply 15 000 litres of
potable water per week to its premises.199 The application followed
the failure by the City of Harare to supply water in the area in which
the applicant’s property was situated (Ballantyne Pak, Harare) for a
190 As above.
191 As above.
192 (104/11) (2012) ZASCA.
193 Judgment 6.
194 Judgment 7.
195 Secs 85(1) & 175(6)(b) Constitution of Zimbabwe.
196 Judgment 7. 
197 As above.
198 HH 137-16 & HC 1796/14.
199 Hopcik judgment 1.
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period of three years.200 In contrast, other properties in Harare had
access to a constant supply of water.201 
While the applicant acknowledged that the City of Harare faced
certain challenges that hindered the provision of water to all residents,
they were of the view that not sufficient steps had been taken to
ensure the equitable distribution of water to all inhabitants.202 Further
to this, the applicant submitted that the City of Harare was derelict of
its duty to supply water to all residents.203
In response to the contentions of the applicant, the City of Harare
argued that it was embattled with a myriad of challenges; most
notably financial constraints.204 Also, the City of Harare cited a
significant growth in the urban population that resulted in the
demand for water outstripping supply.205 Furthermore, the City of
Harare also highlighted the need to factor in the turbulent economic
climate which made it difficult to adequately maintain critical
infrastructure such as water pipes.206 Finally, the City of Harare noted
that erratic rainfall had also exacerbated the situation. It is against this
background that the City of Harare argued that it had been unable to
guarantee the applicant the minimum 15 000 litres of water they
sought.
As part of its arguments, the City of Harare noted that the
legislature had envisioned such a situation when they drafted section
183(1) of the Urban Councils Act,207 which used the word ‘may’ in
relation to the ability of the Council to supply water to its residents.
The exact language used is as follows:208
(1) A council may provide and maintain a supply of water within or
outside the council area and for that purpose the council may – 
(a) in accordance with the Water Act [Chapter 20:22] take such
measures and construct such works, whether inside or outside
the council area, as it considers necessary for the purpose of
providing and maintaining a supply of water;
(b) enter into agreements for the purchase and sale of water and for
any other thing necessary in connection with the maintenance
and supply of water.
The argument of the City of Harare pursuant to this provision holds
weight; nevertheless, it negates the constitutional mandate in section
77 of the Constitution providing everyone with the right to water, a
right in respect of which the state must take reasonable legislative and
200 Hopcik judgment 2. 
201 As above. 
202 As above. 
203 As above. 
204 As above.
205 Hopcik judgment 3.
206 As above. 
207 [Chapter 29: 15].
208 Sec 183(1). 
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other measures, within its resources, to progressively realise the right.
While section 77 speaks generally about the state, the Preamble to
Chapter 14 of the Constitution provides that there must be a
devolution of power and responsibilities given to lower tiers of
government so as to ensure the equitable allocation of national
resources. This is reinforced in section 264 of the Constitution on the
devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities. 
Notwithstanding the above, both respondents submitted that they
were taking steps to alleviate the dire situation.209 They averred that
they had engaged various stakeholders, including investors and
partners. Through these engagements, they had subsequently
managed to receive loans which they hoped to utilise to ease the
situation.210 In addition to this, the Minister had also signed a number
of ‘memorandums of understanding and agreements with different
countries and construction companies with the objective of building
dams, drilling of boreholes so as to improve water supply’.211 Based
on these actions, the respondents hoped to see changes in the water
supply in the near future.212
In looking at the arguments of both parties, the High Court noted
that the right to water was the most basic of rights and was
recognised as a human right by the United Nations General Assembly
through Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010.213 This Resolution places
an obligation on states to take measures to ensure that its citizens
have access to safe, sufficient, affordable, quality and physically-
accessible water.214 To meet this mandate, state parties, therefore,
have to make financial resources available so as to aid in capacity
building and technology transfer.215 The High Court further noted
that this right to water was also entrenched in other international
instruments, such as CEDAW, the CRC and the ICESCR.216 In terms of
this right to water, the Court noted that there was entitlement to
access to a minimum amount of water necessary to sustain life and
health.217 To concretise this argument, the High Court noted the
South African case of Mazibuko,218 where the Constitutional Court
held that the entrenchment of the right of access to water was not
surprising because of its centrality in human life.219
Focusing on legislation, the High Court noted that the right to
water in section 77 of the Constitution was introduced as an
209 Hopcik judgment 2. 
210 As above.
211 As above. 
212 As above.
213 Hopcik judgment 3. 
214 As above. 
215 As above. 
216 As above. 
217 As above. 
218 Mazibuko & Others v City of Johannesburg (CCT 39/09) (2009) ZACC.
219 Hopcik judgment 4.
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enshrined constitutional right in recognition of the right to water. This
was in line with the UN Resolution of 28 July 2010 which placed an
obligation on the state to provide water.220
Turning to the realisation of this right, the High Court cited the
primary obligation to ensure this right as being placed on the state,
through the first respondent.221 However, the state had to take
measures to ensure the implementation of the right, which included
ceding some of the responsibility to the second respondent through
the Water Act and the Urban Councils Act.222 To ensure the
effectiveness of this delegation, the state had to ensure that the local
authorities have enough power and resources to perform this
function.223
In conclusion, the High Court noted that the respondents had both
failed to take reasonable steps to address the challenges.224 The Court
further highlighted the curious disparity in the manner in which water
was distributed to different residents in the town. It underscored the
need to provide water in a manner which was fair and equitable to all
residents. Where challenges existed in particular areas, measures had
to be taken to alleviate this plight, including making use of
technology.225 Consequently, the failure of the respondents was a
breach of section 77 of the Constitution. The High Court then made
the order that the respondents, jointly and severally, be responsible
for ensuring a supply of water to the applicant’s premises.226
Similar to the Mushoriwa case, the Court once again noted the
need to respect and promote socio-economic rights. Differently,
however, this case illustrated that there was a positive obligation on
the state to ensure that socio-economic rights are met, which
obligation also involves the allocation or redistribution of resources.
While the Court dealt with this issue of positive enforcement of rights,
there were more arguments and considerations which could have
been taken into account. The High Court seems to have superficially
treated the issues and marginalised broader socio-economic rights
considerations. The Grootboom case is a good example of which
considerations ought to be taken into account when dealing with the
positive enforcement of rights.227 
In this case, an application was brought by several individuals,
including children, who had illegally moved onto private land as a
220 As above. 
221 As above. 
222 As above. 
223 As above. 
224 Hopcik judgment 6.
225 As above.
226 Hopcik judgment 7.
227 Government of the Republic of South Africa & Others v Grootboom Case CCT 11/00.
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result of the appalling conditions they were living in while awaiting
low-cost housing.228 They were subsequently evicted and moved to a
sports field where they could not erect shelters after their material had
been destroyed during the eviction. On application, they were
granted relief to the effect that the government had to provide them
with shelter until they secured permanent accommodation pursuant
to section 28(1)(c) of the South African Constitution. This decision by
the High Court was then taken on appeal. The respondents argued
that the right to housing was a minimum core obligation which the
state had to comply with, subject to section 26. The Constitutional
Court noted:229
Neither section 26 nor section 28 entitles the respondents to claim shelter
or housing immediately upon demand. The High Court order ought not to
have been made. However, section 26 does oblige the state to devise and
implement a coherent, coordinated programme designed to meet its
section 26 obligations … The order requires the state to act to meet the
obligation imposed upon it by section 26(2) of the Constitution. This
includes the obligation to devise, fund, implement and supervise measures
to provide relief to those in desperate need.
This case was a landmark case in the enforcement of positive socio-
economic rights. It addresses concerns that were not properly
addressed, in the Zimbabwean context, in the Hopcik case (the
Constitution contains a provision similar to section 26 of the South
African Constitution). 
First, the Grootboom case eases ‘separation of powers concerns’. It is
a stellar example of how the judiciary can force the executive the
obligation to ensure that socio-economic rights are protected,
promoted and realised. Second, and closely connected to the first, the
Grootboom case debunks the myth that socio-economic rights are
purely aspirational and should be left in the hands of politically-
accountable politicians.230 From this case, the Zimbabwean courts
can learn that the judicial enforcement of these rights is essential in
the realisation of these rights. 
Third, the Grootboom case settles polycentric arguments. These
arguments centre upon the premise that courts are poorly equipped
to deal with issues the consequences of which go beyond the parties
involved.231 While all justiciable rights, to some degree, entail
polycentric elements, scholars have noted that polycentricity is
considerably high in socio-economic rights litigation.232 The
Grootboom case bears testimony to the fact that the merits of these
arguments are significantly limited. The Constitutional Court
adequately dealt with competing arguments and inter-acting variables
in enforcing the socio-economic rights of the litigants. This was
228 Hopcik judgment para 3. 
229 Grootboom judgment paras 95-96.
230 Trispiotis (n 29 above) 3.
231 As above. 
232 L Lazarus et al (eds) Reasoning rights: Comparative judicial engagement (2014) 320. 
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notwithstanding the alleged inadequate training of judges on policy
matters. The Zimbabwean courts can thus use this judgment as a
benchmark to assert their competence in dealing with these issues.233
However, it should be cautioned that the curriculum of the Bachelor
of Laws (LLB) degree in Zimbabwe is not as broad and
interdisciplinary as that in South Africa. Furthermore, the lack of
specialised interdisciplinary post-graduate legal programmes also is a
cause for concern. These factors could adversely affect the
enforcement of socio-economic rights in Zimbabwe.234
Fourth, Zimbabwe may also learn that the judicial enforcement of
socio-economic rights reinforces the political legitimacy of policies
that support this vision.235 In the Zimbabwean context, this would
support controversial policies such as the Indigenisation and Economic
Empowerment Policy, the Land Reform Policy and the Zimbabwe
Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation, which focus
on realising socio-economic rights of previously-marginalised
individuals. 
Finally, an important aspect of the Grootboom judgment was the
potential effect of the internal limitation on enforcing or realising
socio-economic rights. The Constitutional Court grappled with an
extremely constrained budget for housing and the progressive
realisation of this right.236 In approaching this challenge, the Court
noted the following, that (i) what are considered as reasonable
measures should be interrogated from the prism of the three spheres
of government (national, provincial and local government) and in
view of the Bill of Rights as a whole;237 (ii) the drafters had foresight
of the fact that socio-economic rights could not be realised
immediately, but this did not deprive these rights of their meaningful
content;238 and (iii) only what is possible within the current resources
is expected, thus requiring a balance between goals and means.239
In Zimbabwe, Chapter 4 socio-economic rights also are constrained
by similar limitations such as progressive realisation, reasonableness of
measures and the availability of resources. These internal limitations,
coupled with the general limitation to rights in section 87 of the
Constitution, could potentially limit ‘the protection and possible
enforcement of Chapter 4 socio-economic rights’. This further is
exacerbated by the fact that most of the socio-economic rights in the
233 See, generally, RE Kapindu ‘Courts and the enforcement of socio-economic rights
in Malawi: Jurisprudential trends, challenges and opportunities’ (2013) 13 African
Human Rights Law Journal 140.
234 See, eg, http://www.gzu.ac.zw/bachelor-of-laws-llb-honours-degree/ (accessed
5 March 2016).
235 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ‘Social and
economic rights’ (2014) Constitution Building Primers 6.
236 Grootboom judgment para 14.
237 Grootboom judgment para 44.
238 Grootboom judgment para 45.
239 Grootboom judgment para 46.
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Bill of Rights are of a basic nature. An approach such as that in
Grootboom could assist in restricting the challenges brought by the
internal and general limitations. 
7 Empowering nature of socio-economic rights under 
a transformative constitution
Socio-economic rights are empowerment rights: They allow socially-
vulnerable and marginalised individuals and groups to use the legal
process in order to obtain the satisfaction of their essential socio-
economic needs. Socio-economic rights empower people who are
subject to the jurisdiction of a state to demand that that state acts
reasonably and progressively to ensure that all enjoy the basic
necessities of life. In so doing, these rights progressively enable
citizens to hold government accountable for the manner in which it
seeks to hold government accountable for the manner in which it
seeks to pursue the achievement of social and economic welfare and
development.240
The profound quote above from the work of Kapindu speaks to the
aspirations of the nation (Zimbabwe), as seen through the national
objectives in Chapter 2 and the resolve to protect fundamental rights
and freedoms in Chapter 4 of the Constitution (Declaration of Rights).
The Constitution of Zimbabwe came into being after a prolonged
period of colonialisation in the past and, more recently, a turbulent
political environment that led to the signing of the Global Political
Agreement (GPA) and the creation of an inclusive government.
Therefore, it was imperative that the Constitution be clothed as a
transformative one. Such a constitution would aid in healing past
injustices, and charting an inclusive future where all citizens could
equitably enjoy the resources of the country and share in its
prosperity. 
In a transformative constitution, socio-economic rights allow those
at the bottom of the barrel of society, who wield neither material nor
political power, the opportunity to have access to adequate socio-
economic conditions. Without adequate socio-economic conditions,
the poor cannot maintain their dignity. To these members of society,
civil and political rights mean nothing without accompanying socio-
economic rights which, to them, are more real. For example, imagine
a citizen and his family living on the banks of the Mukuvisi river in
Harare. To this person, the right to vote means a chance in four or five
years to change politicians who are removed from the plight he and
his family bear testimony to. The protection of the right to food, for
example, would be very real to them as this would determine what
meal their family will or will not have. Socio-economic rights accrue
quite naturally to the rich and elitist by virtue of the pedestals on
240 Kapindu (n 233 above) 126.
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which they sit in society. It is quite impossible to find a rich person
who could be deprived of the right to food, as they can easily buy or,
in certain instances, import the food they need for their family.
The reality of our African societies is that poverty is a scourge that is
omnipresent in the lives of the majority of our people. Poverty,
coupled with a lack of opportunity, significantly diminishes socio-
economic conditions. The Constitution of Zimbabwe instituted
significant protection for socio-economic rights in order to mitigate
the effects of poverty and the lack of opportunity. However, this is not
enough as these provisions need teeth through judicial enforcement. 
In a transformative constitution, such as the Constitution of
Zimbabwe, the protection and legal enforcement of socio-economic
rights ensure that there is equality and justice for all. Society cannot
heal if the gap between rich and poor continues to widen, and the
poor are left to live in abject poverty without basic socio-economic
needs. The provision of socio-economic rights in the Constitution
ensures that the aspirations of the founding fathers that fought for the
liberation of Zimbabwe are realised. This leads to the creation of an
egalitarian, prosperous and democratic society, built on the principles
of freedom, equality, peace, justice and tolerance, where the country
can search for new frontiers under a common destiny. 
8 Conclusion 
Zimbabwe’s economic landscape is still littered with the effects of the
‘white colonial regime’ that disenfranchised the masses, and shifted
economic power into the hands of a few (the white minority). To
date, as a result of prolonged deprivation of opportunity, coupled
with political misdirection, many are still deprived of their basic socio-
economic needs. While the masses are still unable to provide for
themselves, a new form of black elite has emerged, leading to a two-
pronged elite system (black elite and white elite). A transformational
constitution was an appropriate action in order to balance the
economic scale of society. The Constitution seeks to create an equal
society, where all can share in the resources and prosperity of the
country.
The article revealed that, although there was initial resistance to
include socio-economic rights as justiciable rights, the new
Constitution includes judicially-enforceable socio-economic rights in
the Declaration of Rights. The provision for socio-economic rights in
the Constitution was shown to reinforce socio-economic rights in
regional and international human rights instruments, such as the
Universal Declaration, the ICESCR, the CEDAW, the CRC and the
ICERD. It was shown that in terms of institutions, the ZHRC has been
awarded significant powers to deal with issues relating to socio-
economic rights and fundamental rights and freedoms. The state,
however, needs to appropriate more resources to the ZHRC, in order
for it to operate at full capacity and discharge its mandate efficiently. 
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The article showed the steadfastness of the judiciary in upholding
fundamental rights and freedoms, including socio-economic rights.
The Mudzuru case proved that even in public interest cases, the courts
will protect and enforce any rights in the Bill of Rights. More specific
to socio-economic rights, the Mushoriwa case showed that the courts
would not hesitate to develop a socio-economic rights jurisprudence.
Accordingly, a wide approach to the interpretation of fundamental
rights and freedoms so that all rights and freedoms could be
comprehensively covered was adopted in the case. The Hopcik case
demonstrated that in cases of the positive enforcement of rights, the
courts would not hesitate to enforce on the state its duty to mobilise
resources to ensure socio-economic rights. Finally, the article suggests
that, in developing socio-economic right in the future, the courts
could benefit from South African jurisprudence, in particular the
Grootboom case. 
